Dual Loyalties

My opinion on the people who shape our world

Tuesday, March 15, 2005

Neocon Espionage: Stephen Bryen - Spy Since 1979

Neocon Espionage: Stephen Bryen: "Neocon Espionage: Stephen Bryen

Neocon Espionage for Israel Starting in 1979
Stephen Bryen (synopsis of full story) was seen in his Senate office with Rafiah, the Mossad (Israeli CIA) station chief in Washington, discussing classified documents spread out on a table in front of an open safe. At another time he was overheard offering these documents to Rafiah. Later, Bryen's finger prints were found on these same documents although he had stated in writing to the FBI he’d never had them in his possession.

In 1979, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert Keuch recommended a grand jury hearing to prepare for prosecution for espionage. After the Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to grant the Justice Department access to key files in the investigation, the investigation was shut down.

In April 1981, Richard Perle, just nominated as assistant secretary of defense for international security, proposed Bryen as his deputy assistant secretary. Bryen received Top Secret ("NATO/COSMIC”) clearance.

In May of 1988, Bryen attempted to approve a license for Varian Associates to export four klystrons (advanced radar technology) to Israel. A meeting was called at which all but Bryen opposed the license. Bryen suggested he ask the Israelis why they needed the klystrons. The Israeli government gave a perfunctory answer, Bryen approved the license, and the klystrons were released.

When Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage found out, he informed the State Department of DOD's “uniformly negative” reaction to the export of klystrons to Israel. The license was withdrawn, and in July, Varian Associates became the first U.S. corporation formally precluded from contracting with the Defense Department.

In April 2001, with the support of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Bryen was appointed a member of the China Commission (in part concerned with Israel's transfer of advanced technology to China) and his appointment has been extended through December of 2005."

JINSA Online -- Advisory Board Biography -- Dr. Stephen D. Bryen

JINSA Online -- Advisory Board Biography -- Dr. Stephen D. Bryen: "Dr. Stephen D. Bryen
Dr. Stephen D. Bryen pioneered the field of technology security as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense from 1981-1988. Responsible for technology security policy and high-tech trade matters affecting national defense, he worked to formulate national policies to protect U.S. military and commercial products, know-how, intellectual property, goods and services. Dr. Bryen founded the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) and served as its first Director.

Dr. Bryen is the President of Finmeccanica, Inc., the U.S. offices of Finmeccanica, S.r.A. Finmeccanica is a global aerospace and defense company, based in Rome, Italy. Finmeccanica companies include AgustaWestland, Alenia Aeronautica, Aermacchi, Elsag, Alenia Spazio, Galileo Avionica, Selenia Communications and Oto Melara. Dr. Bryen also serves on a number of Finmeccanica company Boards.

Dr. Bryen also serves as a Commissioner on the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. He was appointed to the position by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Dr. Bryen is also a Fellow at the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies. In addition, he serves on the Advisory Board of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs."

Statement of Dr. Stephen Bryen Mossad Agent To Congress

Statement of Dr. Stephen Bryen: "TESTIMONY OF DR. STEPHEN BRYEN ON U.S.POLICY ON HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER EXPORTS TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 28, 1999

I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee today concerning the export of high performance computers. As the committee knows, I managed the technology security program for the Defense Department between 1981 until 1988. I have continued to maintain my interest and involvement in high technology and defense issues. My testimony today reflects my personal observations and assessment of the current situation. In my testimony the terms "high performance computer" ("HPC") or supercomputer are interchangeable.

High performance computers are a vital element in United States industrial, economic, political and military leadership. The United States developed the first high performance computers, and continues to lead the world in the development of high performance computer hardware and software.

High performance computers have many military, industrial and commercial applications in addition to their importance in supporting the development of the sciences.

High Performance Computers and Military Risk

My testimony today focuses on the export of high performance computers where there is strategic risk involved. There are a number of countries embarked on nuclear programs and advanced missile development. High performance computers play a vital role in such developments.

There is a great deal of confusion as to just how high performance computers can do more than somewhat less capable computers. It is often said that the United States developed most of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems on computers that were less capable than today’s high performance computers.

HPC’s and Nuclear Weapons and Missile Development

This is true, of course, but it misses the point. Today’s high performance computers offer the following benefits for nuclear and missile development programs.

the ability to perform tens of thousands of calculations in a much shorter period of time with less errors than previously possible, thereby reducing R&D time dramatically
the ability to make calculations using a computer that could only be done in the past by trial and error, thereby reducing R&D costs dramatically
the ability to test designs without having to build prototypes, saving time and expense and masking development efforts, thereby making it difficult to gauge an adversary’s intentions
the ability to develop new types of weapons –such as those than can penetrate deeply buried missile silos, or develop advanced neutron nuclear devices, thereby shifting the balance of power.
In regard to nuclear weapons, the Natural Resource Defense Council points out that high performance computers can be used to

--maintain the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons without having to rely on extensive nuclear testing;

--design and prototype nuclear weapons;

--"certify" changes to existing nuclear weapon types –thereby making it possible to modify the weapons or adapt them to other kinds of delivery platforms such as ballistic missile nuclear submarines;

--design weapons to be more transportable;

--design better nuclear weapons maintenance; improve performance margins and improve weapons shelf life.

Compelling evidence is beginning to emerge that United States transfers of high performance computing capability is helping potential adversary states achieve the benefits and uses described above. For example, the Hong Kong Standard newspaper reported on October 14th that China has completed laboratory simulations of a test launch of its latest multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, the DF-41. Pamela Pun, the Standard reporter, notes that "Mainland sources [told her that the] computer simulations of the launches of the sold-fuelled Dongfeng-41 ICBM have been completed and proved successful." If the story is accurate, and there is no reason to believe otherwise at present, then China almost certainly made effective use of the tremendous computer capability that has been transferred there by the United States.

Civilian and Military End Use

There is a convenient mythology that the United States only exports high performance computers to China for civilian use. However, this is merely an assertion not a fact, since the United States has performed only one Post Delivery Verification (PDV) in China between November 1997 and November 1998 according to the General Accounting Office. And even if the end use site is verified, it would not prove the argument, because almost all of China’s high performance computers are operating in national networks, including those of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), a major nuclear research agency closely integrated in China’s nuclear weapons programs. So long as the U.S. is prepared to export high performance computers to China to organization such as the CAS, it is certain the computers will be used for military purposes. But even if the computers are sent to a Chinese University or a government-owned toy factory, the machines will be available for military R&D.

It is too late to worry about limiting the use of high performance computers in China. The deed has been done, alas: we have deliberately and systematically transferred awesome computer power to an strategic adversary that is openly developing weapons systems targeted against the United States or United States assets abroad.

Impact of HPC Liberalization

There is another myth that the proposed additional liberalization on export controls for unlicensed computers to Tier III countries such as China will only lead to a modest increase in their capabilities. Actually, China is already receiving high performance computers significantly more powerful than those on the control list. The Department of Commerce is simply approving export licenses of machines with a throughput of 36,000 MTOPS or better, even though, as the committee knows, the current decontrol limit is less than 7,000 MTOPS.

The administration proposal to move this to 12,300 MTOPS is misdirection, pure and simple. Machines are simply being licensed to China that are more powerful than 12,300, and the potential for harm to our national security is much greater than the Congress and the American public has been led to believe. This committee should focus on the real exports, not make-believe numbers produced to create an illusion of greater security.

I have focused on China because China has the largest industrial base and already has a well-developed nuclear program and a scientific establishment that is adept at exploiting the value of the high performance computers going to China. Others, such as Pakistan and India, will benefit from these developments as well.

Officially the administration says that the reason for changing the computer controls has to do with the rapid increases in computer power. Desktop computers will soon have as many MTOP’s as today’s supercomputer. Therefore, it is important to "keep pace" with changes in technology, otherwise all we will do is restrict American exports and hand over the business to others.

Definition of High Performance Computers

The current definition of a high performance computer is, indeed, inadequate. The inadequacy is based on the use of a single, badly flawed, parameter to define a high performance computer and differentiate it from a fast, not as high performance, desktop computer. That is not the way to evaluate the power of modern computers. I sometimes have the impression that the administration’s fixation on the single-parameter definition is intended to facilitate dangerous exports to places such as China, perhaps the largest single customer for American supercomputers. This is altogether regrettable and totally unnecessary.

A high performance computer that has strategic importance is one with characteristics that are decisively different from a desktop computer. Among these characteristics are:

HPC’s have tens or hundreds of processors while desktop machines have one or two processors. In the next few years some microcomputers will have 4 or 8 processors, still well short of the tens to hundreds of processors in an HPC machine;
Most of the latest HPC’s are parallel processors. Most desk top machines are not parallel processors;
HPC’s of modern design feature tight coupling between the processors and the memory of the machine; all desk top machines have inferior coupling between the machine processor and memory;
The best HPC’s have random, non-interruptible communication between the machine’s processor and memory; desk top machines have interrupt in their operating system and do not feature such communication;
HPC’s have much more powerful memory access than desktop machines –in fact this is one of their most important features. Memory access takes into account the size of the memory that can be addressed, and the speed memory can be addressed. Taken together this defines the memory bandwidth of HPC’s and distinguishes them from desktop machines. Main memory in an HPC is fully addressable; not so in a desktop.
HPC’s cannot be properly measured by "MTOP’s." The MTOP measurement does not properly register the power of a supercomputer.
There are other less technical distinctions that also need to be factored in. For example, multi-threaded software designed for an HPC won’t run on a desktop, even many desktops linked together and running an operating system such as Linux. A Chinese military operative in many cases is trying to make use of software acquired either legally or illegally from U.S. organizations, such as the Department of Energy. There is no way he can run the software on a Linux box or boxes. He needs a machine "just like" that used by the DOE labs.

Therefore, if we stick with the current single definition of controls on computers, MTOPS, our export control system will not control the right computers and, ultimately, will fail in its strategic purpose even with an administration that is serious about enforcing the rules. It will also continue to require computer producers of desk top type machines to pay a price for strategic export controls that is unreasonable.

Need for a Strategic Evaluation

Linked to this is the fact that the current export control parameters and regime are operating on one wing and a prayer. The wing is nearly broken and, it seems, no one hears the prayer. Why?

The reason is easy to figure out. The current export controls are not based on any coherent strategic evaluation. Our military experts in the government have not been consulted about the threat, have not evaluated the technological and military intentions of countries such as China, and have not been called on to propose controls that might protect America’s strategic interests.

For example, if China can perfect the warheads and penetration aids on its new class of missiles, will that defeat our efforts to build a missile defense, or significantly add to the cost and complexity? Are certain computer exports likely to contribute to China’s ability to rapidly develop such systems? Questions of this kind must be answered, and quickly. Running an export control system without this kind of database is a dangerous mistake.

It is urgent for the Congress to demand such an analysis be carried out. In the meantime it is sensible and prudent to freeze the export of all licensed high performance parallel computers, and block any increase in liberalizing the current de-control, until the Defense and intelligence community can answer such questions and provide coherent and responsible advice on managing the export control system.

Finally I would urge that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to make a serious evaluation of all technology transfers to China, and propose export controls that will leverage America’s advantage in the future. Given the harsh reductions in the American defense budget, the under-investment in military technology and new military systems, and extraordinary delays in getting a serious national ballistic missile defense system deployed, we cannot count on our ability to come through in a clutch as we did in World War II. It is time for a responsible technology security policy."

Dr. Stephen Bryen Spy and Traitor

Stephen Green: Serving Two Flags: Neo-Cons, Israel and the Bush Administration: "Dr. Stephen Bryen and Colleagues

In April of 1979, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert Keuch recommended in writing that Bryen, then a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, undergo a grand jury hearing to establish the basis for a prosecution for espionage. John Davitt, then Chief of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, concurred.

The evidence was strong. Bryen had been overheard in the Madison Hotel Coffee Shop, offering classified documents to an official of the Israeli Embassy in the presence of the director of AIPAC, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee. It was later determined that the Embassy official was Zvi Rafiah, the Mossad station chief in Washington. Bryen refused to be poly-graphed by the FBI on the purpose and details of the meeting; whereas the person who'd witnessed it agreed to be poly-graphed and passed the test.

The Bureau also had testimony from a second person, a staff member of the Foreign Relations Committee, that she had witnessed Bryen in his Senate office with Rafiah, discussing classified documents that were spread out on a table in front of an open safe in which the documents were supposed to be secured. Not long after this second witness came forward, Bryen's fingerprints were found on classified documents he'd stated in writing to the FBI he'd never had in his possession....the ones he'd allegedly offered to Rafiah.

Nevertheless, following the refusal of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to grant access by Justice Department officials to files which were key to the investigation, Keuch's recommendation for a grand jury hearing, and ultimately the investigation itself, were shut down. This decision, taken by Philip Heymann, Chief of Justice's Criminal Division, was a bitter disappointment to Davitt and to Joel Lisker, the lead investigator on the case, as expressed to this writer. A complicating factor in the outcome was that Heymann was a former schoolmate and fellow U.S. Supreme Court Clerk of Bryen's attorney, Nathan Lewin.

Bryen was asked to resign from his Foreign Relations Committee post shortly before the investigation was concluded in late 1979. For the following year and a half, he served as Executive Director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), and provided consulting services to AIPAC.

In April, 1981, the FBI received an application by the Defense Department for a Top Secret security clearance for Dr. Bryen . Richard Perle, who had just been nominated as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, was proposing Bryen as his Deputy Assistant Secretary! Within six months, with Perle pushing hard, Bryen received both Top Secret-SCI (sensitive compartmented information) and Top Secret-"NATO/COSMIC" clearances.

Loyalty, Patriotism and Character

The Bryen investigation became in fact the most contentious issue in Perle's own confirmation hearings in July, 1981. Under aggressive questioning from Sen. Jeremiah Denton, Perle held his ground: "I consider Dr. Bryen to be an individual impeccable integrity....I have the highest confidence in [his] loyalty, patriotism and character."

Several years later in early 1988, Israel was in the final stages of development of a prototype of its ground based "Arrow" anti-ballistic missile. One element the program lacked was "klystrons", small microwave amplifiers which are critical components in the missile's high frequency, radar-based target acquisition system which locks on to in-coming missiles. In 1988, klystrons were among the most advanced developments in American weapons research, and their export was of course strictly proscribed.

The DOD office involved in control of defense technology exports was the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) within Richard Perle's ISP office. The Director (and founder) of DTSA was Perle's Deputy, Dr. Stephen Bryen. In May of 1988, Bryen sent a standard form to Richard Levine, a Navy tech transfer official, informing him of intent to approve a license for Varian Associates, Inc. of Beverly, Massachusetts to export to Israel four klystrons. This was done without the usual consultations with the tech transfer officials of the Army and Air Force, or ISA (International Security Affairs) or DSAA (Defense Security Assistance Agency.

The answer from Levine was "no". He opposed granting the license, and asked for a meeting on the matter of the appropriate (above listed) offices. At the meeting, all of the officials present opposed the license. Bryen responded by suggesting that he go back to the Israelis to ask why these particular items were needed for their defense. Later, after the Israeli Government came back with what one DOD staffer described as "a little bullshit answer", Bryen simply notified the meeting attendees that an acceptable answer had been received, the license granted, and the klystrons released.

By now, however, the dogs were awake. Then Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA, (and now Deputy Secretary of State) Richard Armitage sent Dr. Bryen a letter stating that the State Department (which issues the export licenses) should be informed of DOD's "uniformly negative" reaction to the export of klystrons to Israel. Bryen did as instructed , and the license was withdrawn.

In July, Varian Associates became the first U.S. corporation formally precluded from contracting with the Defense Department. Two senior colleague in DOD who wish to remain anonymous have confirmed that this attempt by Bryen to obtain klystrons for his friends was not unusual, and was in fact "standard operating procedure" for him, recalling numerous instances when U.S. companies were denied licenses to export sensitive technology, only to learn later that Israeli companies subsequently exported similar (U.S. derived) weapons and technology to the intended customers/governments.

In late1988, Bryen resigned from his DOD post, and for a period worked in the
private sector with a variety of defense technology consulting firms.



Bryen and the China Commission

In 1997, "Defense Week" reported (05/27/97) that, ...." the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence reaffirmed that U.S.- derived technology from the cancelled [Israeli] Lavi fighter project is being used on China's new F-10 fighter." The following year, "Jane's Intelligence Review" reported (11/01/98) the transfer by Israel to China of the Phalcon airborne early warning and control system, the Python air-combat missile, and the F-10 fighter aircraft, containing "state-of-the-art U.S. electronics."

Concern about the continuing transfer of advanced U.S. arms technology to the burgeoning Chinese military program led, in the last months of the Clinton Administration, to the creation of a Congressional consultative body called the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission. The charter for the "The China Commission", as it is commonly known, states that its purpose is to...."monitor, investigate, and report to the Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China." The charter also reflects an awareness of the problem of "back door" technology leaks: "The Commission shall also take into account patterns of trade and transfers through third countries to the extent practicable."

It was almost predictable that in the new Bush Administration, Dr. Stephen Bryen would find his way to the China Commission. In April 2001, with the support of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Senator Richard Shelby (R-Alabama) Bryen was appointed a Member of the Commission by Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert. Last August, his appointment was extended through December of 2005.

Informed that Bryen had been appointed to the Commission, the reaction of one former senior FBI counter-intelligence official was: "My God, that must mean he has a "Q clearance!" (A "Q" clearance, which must be approved by the Department of Energy, is the designation for a Top Secret codeword clearance to access nuclear technology.)"

HeraldNet: CIA seizes Sen. Jackson papers

HeraldNet: CIA seizes Sen. Jackson papers: "CIA seizes Sen. Jackson papers

By Lara Bain
Herald Writer
SEATTLE - Five federal government officials, including three from the CIA, have removed several documents from the archival papers of the late Sen. Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson housed at the University of Washington.

Last week the federal document security team spent three days in the special collections division of the UW Suzzallo-Allen library. The officials, which also included people from the Department of Defense and Department of Energy, combed through 1,200 boxes of material using a five-binder index to find the targeted papers.

Carla Rickerson, head of special collections, said the team removed up to 10 documents.

She would not disclose the exact number or subject matter of the documents because of the university's privacy policies.

Rickerson said the papers, now considered classified, are being held in a secure location on campus until federal authorities declassify them.

The majority of the Jackson papers span his years in Congress, the period of 1940 to 1983. A portion are drawn from his pre-congressional years when he worked as a private attorney in Everett and as the Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney.

Jackson was born in Everett and earned his lifelong nickname "Scoop" as a paper boy for The Everett Daily Herald.

Jackson's widow, Helen, donated the collection to the university following the senator's death in 1983.

At that time, a team of UW library staff removed classified information before making the files accessible.

The massive collection includes Post-It notes, constituent letters, personal correspondence, official reports and photos.

They cover a range of policy matters with a significant amount in Jackson's areas of expertise: national defense, foreign policy and the environment.

Since the documents were made available to the public, hundreds of researchers have reviewed them to gain insight about Jackson's role as a public servant."