Dual Loyalties

My opinion on the people who shape our world

Thursday, April 21, 2005

Israeli Spies Rosen and Weissman are being FIRED FOR CAUSE

Israeli Spies Rosen and Weissman are being FIRED FOR CAUSE: "Israeli Spies Rosen and Weissman are being FIRED FOR CAUSE
Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman have been the targets an FBI probe as part of what has become known as the AIPAC/Franklin Spy Scandal. Up until now AIPAC has stood behind the pair and proclaimed their innocence as well as that of AIPAC as an organization. Now the BBC has released that Rosen and Weissman are not only leaving AIPAC but are being FIRED FOR CAUSE. In one of the most amazing acts since the Israeli Embassy refused Israeli Spy Jonathan Pollard sanctuary AIPAC is as much as admitting that Rosen and Weissman are Israeli Spies. So rather than the one way tickets to Tel Aviv that one would expect AIPAC is turning her back on men who only were doing their jobs. Still in all I have to suggest that whether AIPAC has two spies or twenty it pales in comparison to AEI or the crew Paul Wolfowitz had at DoD.

Haaretz - AIPAC Burning Two to Save Itself - How Deep Does The Spy Scandal Really Run
BBC NEWS | AIPAC 'fires staff' Because of Their Conduct
The Epoch Times | Pro-Israel AIPAC Fires 2 Involved in Spy Probe
Forward Newspaper Online: AIPAC Dumping Suspected Spies Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman"

Haaretz - AIPAC Burning Two to Save Itself - How Deep Does The Spy Scandal Really Run

Haaretz - Israel News: "Analysis / AIPAC institutes its own `disengagement plan'

By Nathan Guttman
WASHINGTON - In exactly a month's time, the annual AIPAC Policy Conference will take place in the American capital. The keynote speakers will be U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

AIPAC officials would like to see the event as an unreserved show of support for the lobby and an indication that the crisis over the organization is now over. To this end, AIPAC had to institute its own kind of "disengagement plan" this week. AIPAC realized that it was too heavy a burden to keep policy director Steve Rosen and Iran expert Keith Weissman on its staff. By the time Rice steps onto the podium, they hope, AIPAC will have distanced itself from the affair.

The two senior officials directly concerned with the Franklin affair - Rosen and Weissman - will have to pay the price by facing legal charges, possibly even indictments, analysts in Washington said yesterday, while the organization will emerge almost unscathed. But the price will be a heavy one. Rosen is not merely another AIPAC official; in the eyes of many, he is AIPAC itself. He joined the lobby after the struggle over the sale of AWACS surveillance equipment to Saudi Arabia, a struggle that AIPAC lost but that put it on the map at Capitol Hill.

Rosen pushed not only for lobbying with Congressmen but also directly with the executive branch. His executive lobbying proved a success and Rosen was seen coming and going at the White House, State Department and Pentagon, advocating Israel's case.

While very little is being said by the sides, it is clear that Rosen and AIPAC are not parting as friends. The fact that the announcement about Rosen and Weissman was portrayed differently by each side indicates that they are not leaving of their own free will. One surmise is that AIPAC insisted on presenting their departure as a dismissal in order to convey the message that it takes resolute action against officials who do not abide by regulations and that the lobby itself is not a problematic body.

The AIPAC-Franklin affair has now reached a decisive point. As an organization, AIPAC hopes it has cut out the cancer and can now recover and rebuild its connections that were prejudiced. For the two senior officials, the legal process is just beginning. For the federal prosecutor, Attorney Paul McNulty, the time is approaching when the veil of secrecy over the affair must be lifted and its full scope made public.

Was this a case of an Israeli mole in the Pentagon, a lobby that overstepped its authority, or a one-time act in which the lobby's officials transferred forbidden information to Israeli representatives?"

BBC NEWS | AIPAC 'fires staff' Because of Their Conduct

BBC NEWS | Middle East | Israel lobby in US 'fires staff': "Israel lobby in US 'fires staff'

Aipac is said to wield great influence among US politicians
A powerful pro-Israel lobby group in Washington has fired two top employees said to be involved in an FBI spying investigation, US newspapers report.
The New York Times and Washington Post say the men from the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) are suspected of passing secrets to Israel.

Nobody has been charged with wrongdoing and lawyers for the dismissed men say they did not break any rules.

Aipac said the action was taken after "recently learned information".

Spokesman Patrick Dorton said the "conduct that Aipac expects of its employees" was also a factor in the decision.

Lawyers for the dismissed men - policy director Steve Rosen and senior analyst Keith Weissman - said they have never "solicited, received or passed on any classified documents".

"They carried out their job solely to serve Aipac's goal of strengthening the US-Israel relationship," a statement from the lawyers said.

Fears over Iran

The Pentagon revealed in August last year that a senior official was under investigation for giving Israel access to secret information about US policy towards Iran.

The suspected spy, Lawrence Franklin, worked in the office of Douglas Feith - an official who played a key role in planning the Iraq war, along with the Deputy Defence Secretary at the time, Paul Wolfowitz.

Reports at the time said Mr Franklin was suspected of using his ties to Aipac to pass on the information, though the exact nature of the contacts is not known.

According to the Washington Post newspaper, the FBI raided Aipac's offices twice last year.

Mr Franklin was briefly suspended from his job but is now back at work, though he has reportedly been stripped of security privileges.

Aipac was ranked alongside the National Rifle Association as one of the most effective lobby groups in Washington, often playing a pivotal role in US relations with Israel.

Israel has regularly warned the US it fears Iran is developing nuclear weapons and could use them to destabilise the region."

The Epoch Times | Pro-Israel AIPAC Fires 2 Involved in Spy Probe

The Epoch Times | Pro-Israel US Group Fires 2 Involved in Spy Probe: "Pro-Israel US Group Fires 2 Involved in Spy Probe

Reuters: Apr 21, 2005
WASHINGTON - The pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC has dismissed two senior employees involved in a federal probe into whether secrets on Iran were passed to Israel, sources familiar with the issue said Thursday.
The decision marked a shift in the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee's earlier defense of the two employees- policy director Steve Rosen and senior analyst Keith Weissman.

"The action that AIPAC has taken was done in consultation with counsel after careful consideration of recently learned information and the conduct AIPAC expects of its employees," AIPAC spokesman Patrick Dorton said.

Dorton declined to confirm that the two were fired or to comment on the investigation, but sources close to the organization said Rosen and Weissman were both dismissed in recent days.

Lawyers for the Rosen and Weissman said two had acted properly.

"Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman have not violated any U.S. law or AIPAC policy. Contrary to press accounts, they have never solicited, received, or passed on any classified documents. They carried out their job responsibilities solely to serve AIPAC's goal of strengthening the US-Israel relationship," their attorneys, Abbe Lowell and John Nassikas, said in a joint statement.

Dorton said the statement issued on behalf of Rosen and Weissman "represents solely their view of the facts."

The federal investigation was publicly disclosed last August, and has focused on whether Defense Department analyst Lawrence Franklin passed secret documents about Iran to Israeli intelligence through AIPAC staff members.

No charges have been brought in the investigation, which remains open.

AIPAC initially defended its employees after the probe was disclosed. It issued a statement saying: "Any allegation of criminal conduct by AIPAC or our employees is false and baseless. Neither AIPAC nor any of its employees has violated any laws or rules, nor has AIPAC or its employees ever received information they believed was secret or classified."

Dorton declined to repeat AIPAC's earlier statements on the investigation.

Several sources said criminal charges stemming from the case are not imminent.

The FBI has visited AIPAC's offices at least twice as part of the investigation. They questioned Rosen and Weissman and copied a computer drive. They came back a second time last fall.

So far, four AIPAC employees- not including Rosen and Weissman- have appeared before a federal grand jury. That appearance took place in January.

Israel has denied spying on its main ally. A spokesman for the Israeli embassy had no immediate comment."

Our Man in Jeddah includes Karen Hideko Sasahara

Our Man in Jeddah: "Special Report

Our Man in Jeddah

By Margie Burns
Online Journal Contributing Writer
July 31, 2004—J. Michael Springmann, Esq., was Our Man in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in the Reagan and former Bush administrations, September 1987 through March 1989. In the American consulate in Jeddah, Springmann was chief of the Visa Section.

Twenty-twenty hindsight has revealed to Springmann that he himself was, involuntarily, one of the no-name functionaries admitting terrorists into the United States. He talks colorfully about his Graham Greene-like experience as a consular official in Saudi Arabia.

The situation was dominated by the CIA. Springmann's key allegation is that he often refused to issue visas to foreign nationals, mostly Saudis, whom he wanted to keep out of the United States—and was frequently overruled by superiors, State Department personnel connected with the CIA, who ordered the visas issued anyway. He has aired this central allegation in several open forums and in private interviews.

Some of the back story is matter of record. During Springmann's two years in Jeddah, Springmann must have processed "forty to forty-five thousand visas," deciding which to issue or deny. Jeddah was then the fifth largest visa issuing post in the Middle East, behind Cairo, Riyadh, and a few other cities.

Under Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, anyone displaying the characteristics of an 'intending immigrant' is supposed to be turned down. Springmann turned down people who had no jobs or only menial jobs; had no ties to Saudi Arabia but applied for visas from there; did not speak English; etc. Sometimes a self-declared "university student" would have no record of having applied to any American university. The Consular Section is open for "Nonimmigrant Visa Services" from Saturday through Wednesday 8:00 to 11:00, closed on American and Saudi holidays. Requirements for a visa are clearly listed on its web site.

Rejected applicants were transparently dubious prospects: "they had menial jobs but could afford their tickets"; or they gave ridiculous or unconvincing reasons for wanting to go to the US; or they had forged documents or inadequate paperwork. Some presented a combination of negatives.

The magic attribute here is temporariness. Visas are issued only for a temporary stay. Most Americans thinking about foreigners applying for admission to this country probably think first of some kind of individual merit, or of humanitarian relief. But in a consulate, the Tinker-Bell fairy dust that gets an applicant into the US is some assurance that he won't stay. Like grandchildren, or hookers depending on your point of view, they show up with the assurance that touches the heart of a minor consular official, namely that they will also be going home. Tenderness is not a desideratum for visa issuers: Springmann comments that some applicants—Ethiopians, for instance—were clearly aiming for some kind of asylum; "hey, you want asylum, talk to the UN."

Springmann appeared on a panel at the June 10, 2002, press conference launching UnansweredQuestions.org, a 9-11 research group.

As one anecdote runs, "It wasn't one of these things where they wanted to visit their father in America and there was a question of where they worked, that sort of thing. It was basically two Pakistanis came to me one day and said, 'We want to go to a trade show in America.' And I asked, 'What's the trade show?' They didn't know. 'What city is it going to be held in? They didn't know. And I asked a few more questions and I said, 'No. Visa denied. You haven't proved to me that you're going to come to the United States, accomplish your business and then return home.'

"Well, a few minutes later I had a phone call from a CIA case officer assigned to the commercial section. 'Issue the visas.' I said, 'No.' He said, 'Well, it's important they get a visa.' And I said, 'No.' And a few minutes later he was over talking to the chief of the consular section, reversed me, issued the visas, and these guys took off. And this was typical."

Springmann's guess at the time was that "it was basically visa fraud." He thought that "somebody was paying $2,500 bribes to State Department officials. I was ordered by these same high State Department officials to issue the visas, to shut up, to do my job and ask no questions."

"And this wasn't simply a difference of opinion as was alleged later on," after Springmann was fired and tried unsuccessfully to get his complete personnel file through FOIA requests. If you ask Springmann, it was conspiracy: "I issued visas to terrorists recruited by the CIA and its asset, Osama bin Laden." The period overlapped with the CIA's ongoing strategy of supporting bin Laden's mujaheddin, to inconvenience foreign powers including the Soviet Union.

"I had a Sudanese who was unemployed in Saudi Arabia. He was a refugee from the Sudan and I said, 'You don't get a visa.' And he kept coming back and coming back and coming back. And after a bit I started getting calls from a woman I believe was a case officer who was in the political section. 'We need this guy.' And I said, 'No. He hasn't proved to me that he's going to America and he's going to come back, as the Immigration and Nationality Act says and that the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual says.' Well, in short order I got reversed again and he got his visa for national security reasons. And this went on for a year and a half. I had people, not every day perhaps, but every week."

After the press conference, Springmann agreed to be interviewed. We met at a little raw bar, the Dancing Crab, "just a cut above a dive," a block from the Tenleytown Metro, easy for him to walk to, except for the heat index of about 110 degrees, from his home-office in Northwest DC. Not dealing with James Bond here, but then a consular officer wouldn't be, which seems to be part of the picture behind Springmann's distinctive on-the-job experience as a Rosenkrantz or Guildenstern to the State Department's Hamlet and the CIA's Claudius, caught between the pass and fell incensed points of mighty opposites.

Springmann held several positions in the State Department for about nine years, 1982 to 1991. His first station was New Delhi for two years; then Stuttgart for three years; then Jeddah. After a home leave of two to three months back in DC in spring 1989, he returned to Stuttgart as a political and economics officer for two years.

From there he was assigned to Washington, DC, in the Bureau of Intelligence & Research (INR), an entity probably not a household name, even now—"one of the oldest intelligence organizations going," but dependent on CIA and NSA intelligence. Springmann's description of what they do there, largely, is "take spook stuff and put a State spin on it."

In the more formal language of State, "The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), drawing on all-source intelligence, provides value-added independent analysis of events to Department policymakers, ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes; and serves as the focal point in the Department for ensuring policy review of sensitive counterintelligence and law enforcement activities. INR's primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve U.S. diplomacy. The bureau also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues."

In Springmann's plainer language, INR has an office that coordinates CIA covert activities; in other words, State looks at an operation proposed by CIA, supposedly from a foreign policy angle, and either endorses it or not, depending—according to theory—on whether it's a good idea from a policy perspective. Evidently a position in the INR is no sinecure. The body of one INR veteran, John J. Kokal, was found recently near "the Building," with no shoes or coat on. Murky and underreported accounts attribute the death to suicide and suggest a jump either from State's windows, which do not open, or the roof, which is inaccessible. Kokal, whom Springmann did not know, also worked in Near East affairs.

The CIA is the dominant partner. A Foreign Service career has something rather like tenure for a college professor: up or out, after a certain number of years, except for contract workers. Springmann got fired, after being generically assured with others that he would get tenure; as he said, "pretty much all those who could do their job at all, except for the awfulest of the awfulest," stayed on.

People who had come into their jobs after him got tenure; Springmann was terminated within a few months of his posting to the INR; the thumbs-down decision was not preceded by any official warning letter or reprimand; he was fired with maximum abruptness, in effect leaving him no time to respond through bureaucratic channels. Springmann says frankly that he was fired because he talked and asked about those visas issued in Jeddah to CIA-sponsored terrorists, over his objections.

The exact degree of disappointment involved here, for a man who had planned to be career Foreign Service, can be gauged only somewhat subjectively. Springmann sounds more philosophical than bitter, does little or no name-calling and discusses the situation with more humor than anxiety. He had to interrupt a long interview for an hour, to go home to interview a prospective tenant for a room in his house.

Probably many people fired from their jobs, especially in DC, would like to believe that their firing was engineered by the CIA. Springmann has more grounds than most.

Asked how many or what proportion of applicants he refused, Springmann says that depended on the nationality of the applicant. Almost all Europeans received visas when they applied for them, because "no European in his right mind wants to live in the US"—"they always want to go home." Conversely, he refused nearly all Ethiopians, because they almost always wanted to stay in the US. He would get so tired of turning people down, some mornings began with an inward prayer, intense though non-ecumenical—"Please God, send me a European." He says, "I could look at people in a line, after I'd been there a while," and tell by looking whom he would have to reject. Not only Europeans were admitted, of course. With respect to the Gulf countries, "If somebody came in with a good passport and a good cover story"—like, say, the owner of a rug shop in the region who had frequent business in New York—he was generally issued a visa. Papers of the sort known as 'multiple indefinite visas,' on the other hand, allowing frequent re-entry into the US without going through the approval process each time, went "almost always to Europeans."

This policy might be considered racist, and on some level it is, but it is a function of race privilege going much deeper than simple bigotry. Once again, the Europeans' talisman was . . . they went home. Visa applicants from home countries in better condition as living places tend to get preferential treatment, because they can be counted on to return to their home countries. This longstanding policy raises emphatic questions about how 9/11 suspects got multiple-entry visas to enter the US.

Much has been written about "racial profiling" in connection with terrorism and 9-11. Most of the writing, however, has represented the policy questions as an Antigone's bind, the classical Hegelian dilemma of 'Shall we do the right thing and put ourselves in danger, or Shall we protect ourselves and do something wrong?' A similar debate surrounds efforts to extend the USA PATRIOT Act, using the plea of necessity. The bind is more apparent than real, as Springmann clarifies: existing policy would have been sufficient to keep out many of the September 11 hijackers, had it been applied. In simplest terms, most of the 19 hijackers should never have been allowed into the US to begin with, because they displayed the characteristics of "intending immigrants."

"It's very simple. If you're young, unmarried, don't have a job, you're not supposed to get a tourist visa because you're not likely to return. You're very likely to overstay that visa. Several of the terrorists who supplied the muscle to overpower the flight crews . . . should not have been issued visas in the first place."

Under straightforward regulations prohibiting entry by any "intending immigrant," Springmann found himself reversed by his superiors with a surprising number of rejected applicants. He has mentioned the particular example of the Sudanese man more than once: the man was applying from Saudi Arabia but was unemployed there, and wanted to go to the US for unclear reasons. Springmann refused, but "the political officer"—Karen Sasahara, linked with some unspecified entity besides State—"wanted it done." "So the Chief of the Consular Section at the time okayed it."

Karen Hideko Sasahara is now in the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. She has been linked with the political interests of the Saudis in other contexts. Patricia M. Roush, an American mother trying to get her abducted daughters back from the Saudis in an international custody case, testified to Congress on June 12, 2002, that Sasahara yelled at Roush when she tried to get State's assistance in the case. (Current State Dept Phone Directory Sasahara, Karen H NEA/MAG 5250 202-647-3614)

Springmann was overruled often enough that he complained about it, sometimes informally, but also formally. He told the DC press conference, "I protested to the Counsel for Consular Affairs in Riyahd. I protested to the Bureau of Consular Affairs in Washington. I protested to the State Department's Inspector General. I protested to the State Department's Office of Diplomatic Security. I talked about this to the FBI, to the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility, and I went to a couple of congressional committees. And by and large I was told, 'Shut up. You don't know what you're talking about. This is a difference of opinion. You don't know what you're doing. You're far too junior to question the Counsel General in Jeddah's interest in doing this.' He's a guy that was seen sitting in his office filling out visa application forms for Pakistanis with forged passports. He wanted visas for Libyans who had no ties to our consular district whatsoever."

While the number of refused visas is inexact and varies with the nationality of the applicants, Springmann estimates that he rejected "maybe 25 percent at least." Of these, he was reversed on "maybe as many as 100." The rejected applicants were all male; all Muslim; and almost all Arab, except for some Pakistanis and the Sudanese. Most were from other countries than Afghanistan, although "I did get the odd Afghani"—"generally refused"—like the guy who gave as his reason for wanting a visa that "he wanted to visit his money in New York." Denied.

Some applicants were amusingly transparent, humanitarian concerns aside. "We had a picture of Detroit hanging on one wall—came from somewhere, some State Department official left it. Sometimes I'd get an applicant, ask him where he intended to go once he was in the United States. And you'd see his eyes go to the picture of Detroit, and he'd say 'Detroit.'"

Regrettably, Springmann cannot now remember particular names of applicants he turned down. More regrettably, the folder he kept in Jeddah, paperwork on the applicants he turned down who were subsequently issued visas by his superiors, is in the government's custody if it still exists. It has not been turned over to him in response to his FOIA requests.

The DOJ attorney handling Springmann's FOIA matter was Kirsten Moncada, who made the motion to seal. In August 2001, Moncada received the Attorney General's award for Distinguished Service, "for her exemplary and sustained role in providing legal advice and policy guidance, both within the Department and across the Executive Branch, on sensitive issues arising under the Privacy Act of 1974 . . . Her knowledge, dedication, and analytical skill have earned such respect throughout the Federal Government that she is widely regarded as the preeminent Privacy Act expert in the Executive Branch."

"For whatever combination of reasons, Springmann comments matter-of-factly, "Saudis almost never were refused." The extent of this open but quiet policy is suggested by some of the international custody disputes; allegedly Patricia Roush's Saudi former husband, Khalid al-Gheshayan, was able repeatedly to obtain visas to enter the US in spite of an arrest record, diagnosed schizophrenia, and divorce by the US parent.

Evidently this policy was deemed not generous enough at the J. Michael Springmann level, however. By contrast, the independent film Do Not Enter shows some of the persons denied visas to the US during roughly the same period, under the McCarran-Walter Act: Carlos Fuentes, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Hortensia Allende, Jan Myrdal, Oscar Niemeyer.

Margie Burns lives in Cheverly, Maryland. She can be reached at margie.burns@verizon.net.

The views expressed herein are the writers' own and do not necessarily reflect those of Online Journal.
Email editor@onlinejournal.com
Copyright © 1998-2005 Online Journal™. All rights reserved."

Did John Bolton Murder State Department official John J. Kokal?

Was Bolton behind death of State Department official?: " Special Report

Was Bolton behind death of State Department official?

By Wayne Madsen
Online Journal Contributing Writer
First reported on November 20, 2003, updated April 20, 2005, WASHINGTON, DC—In a case eerily reminiscent of the death of British Ministry of Defense bio-weapons expert, Dr. David Kelly, an official of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Near East and South Asian division (INR/NESA), John J. Kokal, 58, was found dead in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003.

Police indicated he may have jumped from the roof of the State Department. Kokal's body was found at the bottom of a 20-foot window well, eight floors below the roof of the State Department headquarters, near the 23rd and D Street location. Kokal's death was briefly mentioned in a FOX News website story on November 8 but has been virtually overlooked by the major media. In light of recent revelations concerning UN ambassador nominee John Bolton's bizarre and physically abusive behavior, a re-examination of the Kokal death is in order.

Kokal's INR bureau was at the forefront of confronting claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Washington police have not ruled out homicide as the cause of his death. Kokal was not wearing either a jacket or shoes when his body was found. He lived with his wife in Arlington, Virginia.

However, a colleague of Kokal's told this writer that the Iraq analyst was despondent over "problems" with his security clearance. Kokal reportedly climbed out of a window and threw himself off in such a manner so that he would "land on his head." At the time Kokal fell from either the roof or a window, his wife Pamela, a public affairs specialist in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, was waiting for him in the parking garage. Mrs. Kokal had previously worked in Consular Affairs where she was involved in the stricter vetting of visa applicants from mainly Muslim countries after the Sept. 11 attacks.

State Department officials dispute official department communiqués that said Kokal was not an analyst at INR. People who know Kokal told the French publication Geopolitique that Kokal was involved in the analysis of intelligence about Iraq prior to and during the war against Saddam Hussein. According to State Department sources, Kokal briefed Secretary of State Colin Powell at least once a week on Iraq, adding that Kokal was a skeptic on the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Another INR official, weapons expert Greg Thielmann, said he and INR were largely ignored by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton and his deputy, David Wurmser, a pro-Likud neoconservative who recently became Vice President Dick Cheney's Middle East adviser. Kokal's former boss, the recently retired chief of INR, Carl W. Ford, later said that Bolton often exaggerated information to steer people in the wrong directions.

Now that Bolton has been nominated for U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and we have learned through Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings that Bolton was verbally and physically abusive to his colleagues over the past several years, it is time to take a close look at some violent deaths of State Department and CIA officials who tangled with the Bush administration over Iraq policy.

It is noteworthy that Bolton's ideological soul mate at the National Security Council (NSC), ex-Iran-Contra felon Elliot Abrams, has also been psychologically and physically abusive to his subordinates. Bolton and Abrams are long-time friends, having both helped devise the neoconservative game plan for U.S. global domination through their activities with the Project for a New American Century (PNAC).

According to a UPI report, Abrams once led CIA officer Ben Miller (who was on loan to the NSC from the agency) to an open window at the NSC and told him to jump. Abrams and Bolton share a mercurial and maniacal management style that includes physical threats against subordinates. While Bolton was demanding the firing of State Department and CIA personnel, including State Department analyst Christian Westermann and CIA officer Fulton Armstrong, Abrams fired Miller and two of his NSC colleagues, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann.

Ford testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Bolton was a "quintessential kiss-up and kick-down sort of guy." A lingering question is whether Bolton is a "kick out" (as in window) sort of guy. Since Abrams's position at the NSC does not require Senate approval, the testimonies of Miller, Leverett, and Mann against Abrams were never heard by Congress.

A former INR employee revealed that some one-third to one-half of INR officials are either former CIA intelligence agents or are detailed from the agency. He also revealed it would have been impossible for Kokal to have gained entry to the roof on his own. INR occupies both a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) on the sixth floor that has no windows and a windowless structure on the roof that has neither windows nor access to the roof, according to the former official. The other windows at the State Department have been engineered to be shatter proof from terrorist bomb attacks and cannot be opened.

The suspicious fatal fall from the Watergate complex of ex-CIA and NSC official Dr. Gus Weiss a few weeks after Kokal's similar death at the nearby State Department also merits investigation. Weiss, like Kokal, was adamantly opposed to the Iraq war and Weiss, uncharacteristically, went public with his protests.

Weiss worked in the office of Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson in the 1970s, along with Iraqi war architects Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. He also served on the U.S. Intelligence Board under President Jimmy Carter and was considered a hawk during the Carter and Reagan administrations. However, in later years, Weiss broke ranks with his old neoconservative colleagues and came out against the Iraq misadventure.

INR and other State Department officials reported that a "chill" set in at the State Department following Kokal's defenestration. A number of employees were afraid to talk about the suspicious death. It also is unusual that The Northern Virginia Journal, a local Arlington newspaper, has not published an obituary notice on Kokal.

Wayne Madsen is a Washington, DC-based journalist and syndicated columnist. His forthcoming book is "Jaded Tasks: Big Oil, Black Ops & Brass Plates."

The views expressed herein are the writers' own and do not necessarily reflect those of Online Journal.
Email editor@onlinejournal.com
Copyright © 1998-2005 Online Journal™. All rights reserved."